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A peat levee at Wilnis in The Netherlands suddenly failed at the end of the relatively dry summer of 2003. On Monday, 29 August 
2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. gulf coast and breached, among other failures, the 17th Street Canal. These failures triggered 
large research programs. In the Wilnis case, it was eventually deduced that the 5-m horizontal translation of the levee was triggered 
by a combination of reduced weight by evaporation, shrinkage and cracking of the peat material, and an increased head in the sand 
layer under the dike. A key factor in the 17th Street Canal failure was the formation of a gap between the wall and the levee fill on the 
canal side of the fill. Due to climate change, more extreme dry and wet periods, land subsidence, and increasing sea and river levels, 
the horizontal shifting due to cracking is becoming more significant in the safety assessments of levees. In this paper, aspects of 
horizontal failures during extreme dry or wet periods are elaborated. First, a geo-hydrologic design procedure to assess the 
consequences of droughts for cracked peat levees is presented. The design procedure is then validated with measurements of a peat 
levee, the Middelburgsekade, and extreme water table positions that are likely to occur once in a period of 400 years that have been 
predicted for this levee. Furthermore, the most dangerous cracks for the Wilnis case are indicated. Next, the performance of levees 
and floodwalls during Hurricane Katrina are presented. Finally, the failure of the 17th Street Canal breach in New Orleans is 





In the summer of 2003, a peat dyke at Wilnis in the 
Netherlands failed during a very dry period. The failure mode 
was not a Bishop type circular failure used in routine dike 
stability analyses in The Netherlands, see figure 1. 
 
The failed dike segment was displaced horizontally over 6 m. 
The failure plane was found to lie at the boundary between 
peat and the underlying sand. It was concluded that a chain of 
events including weight loss and shrinkage of the peat, due to 
the dry weather conditions, are considered important factors 
causing failure. Analyses of peat behaviour made it clear that 
several processes, controlled by hydrological conditions in the 
unsaturated and saturated zones in the embankment, resulted 
in fracturing of the peat. The fracturing, along with a very 
high-strength anisotropy of the peat, resulted in a connection 
between the water in the canal and the water in the sand, 
thereby raising the piezometric head in the sand by several 
       
meters, allowing the dike to simply ‘float’ away for over 5 m, 
pushed by the water in the canal. A detailed description of this 
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Fig. 1. Failed canal dike at Wilnis, August 2003. 
Visual inspection of drying peat levees shows a cracked levee 
surface, including large and small cracks. Not all the observed 
cracks impose a threat to levee stability. However, from visual 
inspection alone, it is hard to distinguish between the 
dangerous and non-dangerous cracks. The Wilnis failure 
motivated a research program. Development of cracks and the 
influence of cracks on levee stability were important topics in 
this study. The study resulted in an evaluation tool for geo-
hydrological boundary conditions for stability analysis and the 
results provided insight into crack development that will 
improve visual inspection during future extreme conditions.  
 
 
GEO-HYDROLOGIC BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
 
The first part of the research project from the Wilnis case 
focused on a geo-hydrologic design procedure that used the 
unsaturated flow module PLAXIS (Brinkgreve and van Esch 
2003). In addition to the unsaturated flow, an expression for 
saturation and relative permeability was derived. Furthermore, 
the influence of cracks is implemented in the model. An agro 
meteorological model that simulates evapo-transpiration and is 
coupled to the groundwater flow model was developed. This 
model also includes hysteresis in drying and wetting of the 
soil. In van Esch et al. (2007), this complex model and its 
implementation and validation in Plaxflow has been 
described.  
 
For the validation of this model, the consequences of droughts 
for an existing peat dike, the ‘Midedelburgsekade’ near 
Boskoop in the Netherlands, were studied for successive 
periods of drought and precipitation over a period of three 
years starting 1 January 2004.  
 
Based on cone penetration tests and Begemann borings, a 
ground profile was composed and a Plaxis model was 
generated. Figures 2 and 3 show the layering of peat and clay 
and displays the points where the groundwater heads were 









Fig. 3. Position water table in August 2005. 
 
The water pressure field obtained for the summer of 2005 is 
shown in Figure 3 as an example. Measured heads in the 
observation wells and calculated heads in corresponding 
nodes are given over a period of three years in Figure 4, 
starting (= day 0) on 1 January 2004. Both signals show a 
seasonal variation due to evapo-transpiration and a high-




Fig. 4. Measured and calculated groundwater levels 
 
 
From these results, it was concluded that calculated data 
resembled the measured data quite well although it was hard 
to reproduce measured head data exactly because the 
measurement data already showed a wide variability due to 
the natural spatial variability of peat material and the three-
dimensional shape of the levee surface.  
 
Precipitation and evapo-transpiration data were analyzed over 
a period of 40 years. For each year, maximum net 
precipitation and maximum net evapo-transpiration data were 
assembled in a histogram. Figure 5 shows the cumulative 
frequency distribution of maximum values of daily outflux 
data per year and the fitted cumulative Gumbel distribution. 
 
The same procedure was repeated for weekly averaged and 
monthly averaged data. Extreme precipitation events that will 
take place once in a period of 400 years are: 101 mm/d during 
a day, 21 mm/d during a week, and 8 mm/d during a month. 
Calculations give an extreme evapo-transpiration over the 
same period as 10 mm/d during a day, 8 mm/d during a week, 
and 6 mm/d during a month. Calculations pointed out that 
loading the dyke with an extreme precipitation (extreme 
rainfall) over a week represents the upper bound water table 
for an extreme wet period. Loading the dyke with an extreme 
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evapo-transpiration over a month gave the lower bound (i.e., 






















Fig. 5. Extreme daily inflow data 
 
 
The maximum difference in position for extreme loading 
occuring only once every 400 years gives a difference in the 
position of the water table of 1.3 m. 
 
Boundary conditions for a range of loading periods have been 
calculated for peat dykes in the Netherlands. These conditions 
can be used in groundwater flow calculations. The obtained 
water pressure fields for each loading case are prescribed in 
stability calculations that assess the safety of the peat dyke for 
the extreme loading period. This methodology is now 
proposed as a design procedure. Furthermore, the model now 
can predict drying and wetting of the levee due to climate 
conditions, which is the first step to predict cracking of levees. 
 
 
INFLUENCE OF CRACKS IN THE WILNIS CASE 
 
An inventory of cracks in peat levees during the dry period of 
2003 shows that in most cases cracks occur longitudinally in 
the crown of the levee (Lubking and Van 2007). In some 
cases, cracks in the slope or an angle of 45 degrees or 
perpendicular to the levee are observed. Due to decreasing 
water content, the peat material will shrink. The deformations 
then will be downward of the slope and cracks will occur in 
the crest due to tensile forces exceeding the tensile strength. If 
these cracks occur without vertical displacements, shrinking 
of the levee is assumed the cause; if vertical deformation is 
observed, a stability problem may be the cause. 
 
The question remains whether or not a shrinking crack in a 
longitudinal direction can initiate a stability problem. 
Therefore, for the Wilnis case, a number of FEM calculations 
have been made with cracks from 2 to 4 m deep (see figure 6); 
the cracks are numbered with letters A to G.  
 
In figure 7 the shear strain is shown for the situation without 
cracks. Cracks A and B give a small reduction of 2 to 3% in 
the safety factor; for Cracks C and D the reduction is 1% or 
less. Furthermore, the calculations show that Cracks C and D 
will close due to deformations. This means that during a real 
stability problem in the levee, Cracks C and D will also close. 
Cracks E, F, and G reduce the initial stability; but due to the 
deformations, these cracks will close with little influence on 









Fig. 7. Calculated shear strain. 
 
 
The influence of water in Crack B is studied. If the crack is 
fully filled with water, the influence on the calculated safety 
factor is a reduction of 16%, which is a substantial reduction. 
 
It is concluded that the most dangerous cracks in the 
longitudinal direction are those on the outer site of the levee 
crown that are or can become filled with water. 
 
 
NEW ORLEANS FLOODWALL AND LEVEE 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
On Monday, 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the 
U.S. gulf coast. The effects of the storm were felt in the New 
Orleans area during the early morning hours. The storm 
produced a massive surge of water on the coastal regions that 
overtopped and eroded away levees and floodwalls along the 
lower Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish, along the 
eastern side of St. Bernard Parish, along the eastern side of 
New Orleans East, and in locations along the Gulf Intracoastal 
Waterway (GIWW) and the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal 
(IHNC). Surge water elevated the level of Lake Pontchartrain, 
and shifting storm winds forced the lake water against the 
levees and floodwalls along its southern shores and New 
Orleans outfall canals resulting in high surge levels in the 
IHNC, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), the 
GIWW, and the Mississippi River. 
 
The performance of levees and floodwalls varied significantly 
throughout the New Orleans area. The investigation 
conducted post-Katrina indicates that the two main causes of 
breaches in the floodwall and levee system were erosion due 
to overtopping and instability due to soil foundation failure. 
Breaches due to instability of floodwalls occurred at one 
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location on the 17th Street Canal, two locations on the London 
Avenue Canal, and one location on the IHNC, as shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
17th Street Canal Breach








Fig. 8. Location of breaches in Orleans Parish, 
East Bank 
 
Soil conditions in the area of the New Orleans outfall canals 
have been determined through evaluation of existing and 
recently drilled engineering borings, earlier geologic mapping 
studies of the area (Dunbar et al. 1994, 1995; Dunbar, Torrey, 
and Wakeley 1999; Saucier 1994), and new studies performed 
since August 2005. Geologic mapping of the surface and 
subsurface in the vicinity of the canal failures identifies 
distinct depositional environments related to Holocene (less 
than 10,000 years old) sea level rise and deposition of 
sediment by Mississippi River distributary channels during 
this period. Overlying the Pleistocene surface beneath the 
17th Street Canal are approximately 50 to 60 ft (15 to 18 m) 
of shallow water, fine-grained sediments consisting of bay 
sound or estuarine, beach, and lacustrine deposits as indicated 
in the cross section shown in Figure 9. Overlying this shallow 
water sequence are approximately 10 to 20 ft (3 to 6 m) of 
marsh and swamp deposits that correspond to the late stages 
of deltaic sedimentation as these deltaic deposits became sub 
aerial. A buried barrier beach ridge extends in a southwest to 
northeast direction in the subsurface along the southern shore 
of Lake Pontchartrain. A stable sea level 10 to 15 ft (3 to 4.5 
m) lower than current levels permitted sandy sediments from 
the Pearl River to the east to be concentrated by longshore 
drift and formed a sandy spit or barrier beach complex in the 
New Orleans area (Saucier 1994).  
 
The site of the levee breach at the 17th Street Canal is located 
on the northern side of the beach ridge where the sand ridge is 
thinner. There is a layer of clay between the sand and the 
marsh layer; whereas both of the London Canal breaches are 
located over the thickest part of the barrier beach ridge 
complex, the sand deposit lies directly beneath the marsh 
layer, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Geological cross section extending west to east across 
eastern Jefferson Parish and into western Orleans Parish. 
Section runs from near the 17th Street Canal to the Inner 
Harbor Navigation Canal. Major outfall canals in 
Orleans Parish are noted on the section. 
 
 
BREACH AT 17TH STREET CANAL 
 
Observations made of the breach at the 17th Street Canal 
show that the most likely cause of the breach is a soil 
foundation failure. Figure 10a shows an aerial photo of an 
approximately 450-ft (140-m) breach in the floodwall along 
the east side of the 17th Street Outfall Canal south of the old 
Hammond Road Bridge. Figure 10b shows that a section of 
levee has moved more than 40 ft (12 m) inward to the 
landside. It appears that the water flowing through the breach 
washed away the remaining levee section making up the 
breach. The top of the I-wall section of the floodwall in the 
breach can be seen adjacent to the levee section that moved 




Fig. 10. (a) aerial view of breach, (b) aerial view 
showing I-wall and embankment translation. 
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After the emergency closure was complete and the water 
levels were drawn down, large blocks of the marsh were 
found strewn in neighborhoods surrounding the breach. A 
close examination of the marsh blocks revealed that an 
approximately 1-ft (0.3-m) clay layer was attached to the 
bottom of the marsh blocks. In order to inspect the failure 
plane or zone, a backhoe trench was excavated to expose a 
vertical surface through the slide block. Observations made in 
the trench confirmed that a portion of the clay layer, which 
was initially located beneath the marsh layer, was displaced 
upward and over a portion of the marsh layer by the lateral 
displacement that occurred during the failure. The failure 
plane of the slide block was within the clay under the levee, 
and the failure plane came upward through the marsh layer 
further landward. 
 
A considerable number of borings had been made in the 
breach area and in neighboring areas before the failure. 
Additional borings have been drilled, cone penetration tests 
have been performed, and test pits have been excavated since 
the failure. Several hundred unconfined compression tests and 
unconsolidated-undrained (UU) tests have been conducted on 
the soils at the site. As shown in Table 1, the subsurface in the 
breach area was divided into six soil types over the depth of 
the investigation. 
 































































The levee fill is compacted CL or CH material with an 
average liquid limit of about 45%. Beneath the fill is a layer of 
marsh 5 to 10 ft (1.5 to 3.0 m) thick. The marsh is composed 
of organic material from the cypress swamp that occupied the 
area and silt and clay deposited in the marsh. The average 
moist unit weight of the marsh is about 80 pcf (pounds per 
cubic feet) (12.57 kN/m3). Beneath the marsh is a lacustrine 
clay layer with an average liquid limit of about 95%. 
Having been covered and kept wet by the overlying layer of 
marsh, the clay is normally consolidated throughout its depth. 
The measured shear strengths of the levee fill scatter very 
widely, from about 120 psf (5.7 kN/m2) to more than 5,000 
psf (240 kN/m2), and cannot be interpreted without applying 
judgment. Emphasis was placed on data from UU tests on 
5-in.- (0.13-m-) diameter samples, which appear to be the best 
quality data available. The value su = 900 psf (43 kN/m2) is a 
reasonable value to represent the levee fill. 
 
The marsh (or peat) deposit is stronger beneath the levee crest 
where it was consolidated under the weight of the levee and 
weaker at the toe of the levee and beyond where it was less 
compressed. The measured shear strengths of the marsh 
scatter very widely, from about 50 psf (24 kN/m2) to about 
920 psf (44 kN/m2). Values of su = 400 psf (19.2 kN/m2) 
beneath the levee crest and su = 300 psf (14.4 kN/m2) beneath 
the levee toe appear to be representative of the measured 
values. The clay, which has been found to be the most 
important material with respect to stability of the I-wall and 
levee, is normally consolidated. Its undrained shear strength 
increases with depth at a rate of 11 psf (0.5 kN/m2) per foot 
(0.3 m) of depth. This rate of increase of strength with depth 
corresponds to a value of su /p’ = 0.24. There is very little 
scatter in the results of the Cone Penetration Test with pore 
water pressure measurements—piezocone test (CPTU), and 
these values provide a good basis for establishing undrained 
strength profiles in the clay. The undrained strength at the top 
of the clay is equal to 0.24 times the effective overburden 
pressure at the top of the clay. With this model, the undrained 
shear strength of the clay varies with lateral position and is 
greatest beneath the levee crest where the effective 
overburden pressure is greatest. The undrained shear strength 
is the least at the levee toe and beyond where the pressure is 
lowest, and varying with depth, increasing at a rate of 11 psf 
per foot (1.7 kN/m2/m) at all locations. Strengths from this 
analysis are compared to the design strengths in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Strengths Used in Design with Those 
Determined in This Analysis 
 
Material Strength Used for Design 
Strength Model Based on 
Data from This Analysis 
Levee Fill su = 500 psf,  
(23.9 kN/m2)  
φ = 0 
su = 900 psf, (43.1 kN/m2)  
φ = 0 
Marsh su = 280 psf,  
(13.45 kN/m2)  
φ = 0 
su = 400 psf, (19.2 kN/m2) 
φ = 0 beneath levee crest 
su = 300 psf, (14.4 kN/m2) 
φ = 0 beneath levee toe 
 
 
Limit equilibrium analyses were used to examine stability of 
the levee and I-wall. The results of these analyses are 
interpreted in terms of factors of safety and probabilities of 
failure. Stability analyses were performed for three cross 
sections within the breach area using the shear strength model 
Paper No. 2.20 5 
in column three of Table 2. The results of these analyses were 
compared with the results of the analyses on which the design 
of the I-wall was based; additional analyses were performed 
for the design cross-section geometry and shear strengths 
using Spencer’s method and the computer program SLIDE. 
The SLIDE analysis results were checked using UTEXAS4. 
The calculated factors of safety decreased as the elevation of 
the water level on the canal side of the wall increased. Smaller 
factors of safety were calculated when it was assumed that a 
gap existed between the wall and the soil on the canal side of 
the wall, with hydrostatic water pressures acting within this 
gap, increasing the load on the wall. The factors of safety 
calculated in the design analyses were higher than the factors 
of safety calculated for the conditions that are believed to best 
represent the actual shear strengths, geometrical conditions, 
and loading at the time of failure. The principal differences 
between the design analyses and the conditions described in 
this report relate to (1) the assumption that a gap formed 
between the wall and the levee soil on the canal side of the 
wall, and (2) the fact that the design analyses used the same 
strength for the clay beneath the levee slopes and the area 
beyond the levee toe as was used for the zone beneath the 
crest of the levee. The strength model used in this analysis has 
lower strengths beneath the levee slopes and beyond the toe. 
 
Centrifuge physical modeling of the 17th Street East Bank 
levee was conducted. The centrifuge model results revealed 
that the gap formation had a major contribution to all of the 
breaches on the outfall canals. In all of the scale models where 
the toe of the sheet-pile wall terminated in the clay layer, such 
as the 17th Street Canal breach location, a translational failure 
occurred through the clay when the gap opened and filled with 
water. This was clearly seen in the instruments recording 
movement of the wall and in the video imagery. More details 
can be found in IPET 2007. 
 
Two-dimensional finite element soil-structure interaction 
analyses with PLAXIS and FLAC using a nonlinear 
hyperbolic soil stress-strain model were conducted to provide 
a third approach to the development of a complete 
understanding of the 17th Street Canal breach mechanism. 
The finite element analyses show that a gap formed as the 
water rose on the canal side of the wall. The criterion for gap 
formation was earth pressure against the wall was less than the 
hydrostatic water pressure at that depth. When that condition 
was reached, the finite element mesh was adjusted to separate 
the soil elements from the wall elements with a gap. The gap 
began to open when the water in the canal rose to elevation 
6.5 ft (2.0 m). Eventually, the gap extended to the tip of the 
sheet pile, which was at the lacustrine clay-marsh interface. 
Factors of safety were computed using the strength-reduction 
method. The strength-reduction method involves performing a 
series of finite element analyses using values of the strength 
parameters c and φ (or c’ and φ’) that are reduced by dividing 
them by assumed values of factor of safety. The correct factor 
of safety, as determined by this method, is the smallest value 
that results in unstable conditions in the analysis. When the 
gap developed and filled with water, the factor of safety 
decreased suddenly by about 25%, from 1.45 to 1.16. The 
development of a gap, which immediately filled with water, 
resulted in a marked increase in calculated displacements. As 
the water in the canal rose from 6.5 to 9.0 ft (2.0 to 2.7 m) 
NGVD, the maximum lateral deformation increased from 1.6 
to 5.3 ft (0.5 to 1.6 m) and the factor of safety decreased from 
1.16 to 0.98. A figure representing the analysis is shown in 




Fig. 11. Deformed mesh for canal water elevation 9.0 ft 
(2.7 m) (canal water elevation not to scale in figure). 
 
 
Eyewitness reports indicate that the breach began to develop 
about 6:00 a.m. on Monday, 29 August 2005, and was fully 
developed before 9:00 a.m. Field evidence, analyses, and 
physical model tests show that the breach was due to 
instability caused by shear failure within the clay in the 
foundation beneath the levee and the I-wall with a rupture 
surface that extended laterally beneath the levee and exited 
upward through the marsh layer. A key factor in the failure 
was the formation of a gap between the wall and the levee fill 
on the canal side of the wall, which allowed water pressure to 
act on the wall below the surface of the levee. Another 
important factor was the low shear strength of the foundation 






This paper presents a geo-hydrologic design procedure for 
extreme drying or wetting boundary conditions. Extreme 
wetting boundary conditions for the Dutch situation should be 
applied over a week to produce the highest position of the 
water table; for dry conditions, the one-month period is 
indicative of the lowest water table. For the 
Middelburgsekade, it is concluded that the maximum 
difference in position for extreme wetting or drying as it 
occurs once every 400 years gives a difference in the position 
of the water table of 1.3 m.  
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A study on the location of the most dangerous cracks on the 
levee shows that the most dangerous cracks in the longitudinal 
direction are those on the outer side of the levee crown that 
are or can become filled with water. 
 
From the 17th Street Canal breach study, it was concluded 
that a key factor in the failure was the formation of a gap 
between the wall and the levee fill on the canal side of the 
wall, allowing water pressure to act on the wall below the 
surface of the levee. 
 
The overall conclusion is that cracks close to the outer side of 
the crown, which can be filled with water, are extremely 
important to be recognized and dealt with, especially when 





Bezuijen, A., G.A.M. Kruse, and M.A. Van [2005]. “Failure 
of peat dikes in the Netherlands,” Proc.Twelfth Intern. Conf. 
on Soil Mech. and Geo. Eng., Osaka. 
 
Brinkgreve, R.B.J., J.M. van Esch [2003]. “Plaxflow manual,” 
A.A. Balkema, Lisse. 
 
Dunbar, J.B., M. Blaes, S. Dueitt, and K. Stroud [1994]. 
Geological investigation of the Mississippi River deltaic plain. 
TR GL-84-15, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment 
Station, Vicksburg, MS. 
 
Dunbar, J.B., V.H. Torrey, and L.D. Wakeley [1999]. A Case 
History of Embankment Failure: Geological and Geotechnical 
Aspects of the Celotex Levee Failure, New Orleans, 
Louisiana. TR GL-99-11, USACE Waterways Experiment 
Station, Vicksburg, MS. 
 
van Esch, J.M., M.A. Van, R.E.A. Hendriks, J.J.H. van den 
Akker, U. Forster, and R.J.G. van Etten [2007]. Geo-
hydrologic design procedure for peat dykes under drying 
conditions, NUMOG X Pande & Pietruszczak (eds) Taylor & 
Francis group London. 
 
Lubking P., and M.A. Van [2007]. Veenkadenonderzoek 
deelproject 3: invloed scheuren op faalmechanismen 
Onderdeel A: scheurvormingsprocessen, GeoDelft report nr 
415341.003. 
 
Saucier, R.T. [1994]. Geomorphology and Quaternary 
Geologic History of the Lower Mississippi Valley. Mississippi 
River Commission, Vicksburg, MS. 
Paper No. 2.20 7 
